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Abstract 
 
This article examines the European Parliament’s and Council of Minister’s use of post-
Lisbon legislative vetoes to override the European Commission’s rulemaking. Using an 
original data set of legislative vetoes of Commission acts by both European legislators from 
December 2009 - April 2017, the contribution shows that levels of the formal exercise of 
the legislative veto to overrule the Commission’s regulatory policies are very low. 
Particularly interesting, the level of exercise of legislative veto provisions has not increased 
significantly since the Lisbon Treaty came into effect, suggesting that the ways in which 
the Treaty formally augmented the powers of legislative scrutiny have not resulted in 
appreciably greater formal exercise of these powers ultima ratio. Moreover, no significant 
differences appear between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.   
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Introduction 
Many contemporary governments couple broad delegation of rulemaking powers to 
administrative bodies with a scheme allowing the legislature to veto or disapprove of 
administrative rules (Wade and Forsyth, 2004; Mullan, 2001; Pearce and Argument, 2005). 
From the legislature’s perspective, this pairing has some logic. On the one hand, 
legislatures have well-documented incentives to delegate broad powers to administrative 
agencies in part because of the greater time, flexibility, and expertise of dedicated 
administrators, and in part because it allows the legislature to avoid direct accountability 
for hard choices (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999). On the other hand, a scheme for 
legislative scrutiny allows the legislature an institutional means to assert control over the 
vast lawmaking activities that their delegations have set in motion.  
Until 2006, the European Union (EU) had one of these elements, but not the other 
(Pollack, 2003). The EU legislative bodies—the European Parliament (EP) and Council of 
Ministers (Council)—had an established practice of delegating broad powers to the 
European Commission (Bergström 2005). The European Commission (Commission), in 
turn, has been a prodigious maker of delegated legislation. It was not until 2006, in response 
to growing concerns about comitology’s democratic accountability that both EU legislators 
obtained a legislative veto, i.e. the power to nullify Commission’s actions. This creation of 
the so-called ‘regulatory procedure with scrutiny’ (RPS) was symbolically important 
because it granted the EP powers over the formulation of Commission administrative acts 
that more accurately reﬂected its powers in co-decision (Vaccari and Lintner, 2009). It also 
brought the EP’s formal role of oversight closer to equal footing with the Council (Blom-
Hansen, 2011).  
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The European Parliament, however, continued to bridle at not standing on perfect 
equal footing with the Council in oversight of the Commission’s delegated legislation 
(Brandsma, 2013). In explicit response to these parliamentary concerns, the Lisbon Treaty 
eventually provided a new legal basis for delegated legislation in Article 290 of Treaty on 
the functioning of the European Union (TFEU), creating so called ‘delegated acts’ (DA), 
and also established new procedures for EP and the Council to exercise legislative scrutiny 
over the Commission’s DA (Hardacre and Kaeding, 2011), including elimination of a 
requirement that the veto be based on one of a designated number of grounds. It is Article 
290 TFEU that put the EP and Council on a virtually equal footing with regard to the 
legislative scrutiny of Commission quasi-legislative acts.   
How have these legislative veto rights over quasi-legislative acts operated in 
practice and why? Have the reforms introduced in the Lisbon Treaty which were heralded 
as increasing the powers of EP had concrete effects?   
Based on the costs of collective action within EP, the Commission’s institutional 
interest in avoiding conflict with EP, and the relatively low costs for individual members 
of Parliament (MEPs) to bargain informally with the Commission in response to interest 
group monitoring and pressure, this article hypothesizes that the EP will infrequently 
invoke its newly granted power to veto DAs. The slightly lower costs of collective action 
in the Council suggest that it might make more use of its veto powers than the EP.   
This article tests these hypotheses with regard to the EP´s and Council’s actual 
exercise of veto rights between December2009 and May 2017. Our data illustrate an 
extremely modest formal use of legislative vetoes under the post-Lisbon DA. In addition, 
it reveals little difference in the EP´s and the Council’s formal use of legislative vetoes. By 
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proving a political economy analysis as well as data on recent experience, I am able to 
explain this practice. Further, by isolating the importance of informal negotiating for 
amendments to the Commission’s draft measures, I expose that a critical aspect of 
understanding the relationship between the Commission and the EU legislative bodies is 
understanding the efficacy of individual legislators, committees or representatives in EP 
and the Council in obtaining adjustments in secondary legislation from the Commission 
outside of formal legislative vetoes  – aspects which will be critical for future scholarly 
work on the effective control the European legislators exercise over the Commission. 
The article is organized as follows. I first briefly describe the DA procedure for 
exercising legislative vetoes. I then develop hypotheses about how legislators are likely to 
use formal veto powers over administrative lawmaking or quasi-legislative actions, i.e. 
how Parliament and Council are likely to use their veto powers over the Commission and 
then present our empirical analysis for legislative vetoes by Parliament and Council from 
December 2009 – April 2017. I conclude by assessing the ways in which legislative 
scrutiny provisions in the field of delegated legislations affect formal EU policy-making.  
 
1. The mechanics of secondary legislation and legislative vetoes in the EU 
Delegated acts (DA): variable time period for vetos/objections 
The delegated act (DA) process is a sharp departure from the RPS two-tier procedure 
practice. Overall, the process has been simplified because now the Commission presents 
its DA directly and simultaneously to both legislators treating Council and EP equally in 
this respect. The legislators then both have the same time determined by the basic act to 
object to the act on any grounds, as opposed on only on the three legal grounds for objection 
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specified by the RPS. The new one-tier DA procedure is simpler, but each basic act can set 
out different conditions for DAs on a case-by-case basis.  
While we know a lot about comitology, its various phases of reform since the 1960s 
(Héritier et al., 2013), its committee workings (Dehousse, 2003; Pollack, 2003; 
Christiansen, Oettel and Vaccari, 2009; Brandsma and Blom-Hansen, 2010; Brandsma, 
2013; Dehousse, Fernández Pasarín and Plaza, 2014), as well as about how the post-Lisbon 
comitology regime in helping to reduce the democratic deficit of the EU (Georgiev, 2013) 
and its effects on the inter-institutional balance (Hofmann, 2009; Moury and Héritier, 2012; 
Héritier, 2012; Christiansen and Dobbels, 2013), we know very little about the practices of 
the RPS procedure and DAs (Hardacre and Damen, 2009; Kaeding and Hardacre, 2013; 
Voermans, Hartmann and Kaeding, 2014). Seven years after the entry into force of Article 
290 TFEU, we lack somehow the empirical evidence of the practices of delegated quasi-
legislative powers in the EU, which has become a major ‘battlefield in EU governance’ 
(Hardacre and Kaeding, 2010, p. 4, Kaeding and Stack, 2015).  
The political economy of legislative vetoes 
Political economy literature provides a useful reference point to generate some 
expectations about how these processes might work in practice. I draw on the literature on 
legislative scrutiny and bargaining in the US context because that literature is well 
developed (Volden & Wiseman, 2011) and because the US also had a long experience with 
legislative veto provisions.  Even though party dynamics and committee structures are 
different in the EP and the US Congress, the political economy literature and US experience 
under the legislative veto is useful because, like the EU, the US is a system of separated 
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powers with a dual legislature and executive, with each body representing a different 
constituency (Bignami, 1999, pp. 466-69).  
Two sets of dynamics which operate together – the relative lack of incentives of 
members of legislatures in systems of separated powers to invest resources to engage in 
oversight and the bargaining dynamics between the legislature and a risk-avoiding 
bureaucracy—suggest that legislative vetoes will be enacted very infrequently. First 
consider the incentives of members of the legislature in exercising a legislative veto. As a 
general matter, legislatures face notoriously high transaction costs to engage in collective 
action (Moe and Wilson, 1994).  
Legislative action, particularly in the EP, faces multiple veto points; it can be 
thwarted at the EP´s committee level, in disputes over jurisdiction among multiple EP 
committees, or by those who set the agenda for floor consideration. Even if a veto measure 
were able to make it onto the legislative agenda, it would have to obtain an absolute 
majority (AM) of MEPs and a qualified majority (QMV) of Member States (MS) in the 
Council in order to pass either legislative body. Just as important, RPS measures and DA 
tend to be technical and thus requiring significant investment to understand. This suggests 
that the costs of oversight for members of the legislature, educating others about the 
Commission’s action in question, and assembling a coalition are likely to be very high 
relative to their rewards.  
The timing requirements for legislative action to override Commission act 
exacerbate these issues. To veto any Commission regulatory policy, the EP or Council must 
normally act within a maximum of four months. That reduces the time for legislators to 
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master the files once they have attracted interest, and imposes a very short time line for 
assembling a coalition.   
Furthermore, the Commission – perhaps because of its more attenuated political 
accountability – is notoriously adverse to prompting public conflict with EP (Gornitzka 
and Sverdrup, 2008; van Gestel, 2014). As a result, the MEPs and the Council will have an 
especially strong capacity to extract concessions from the Commission, and over time, to 
create a climate in which the Commission will anticipate legislative policy. Effectively, 
because the Commission places a high value on avoiding confrontation and sanctions, the 
EP and Council will exercise ‘latent control’ over the Commission without having to 
exercise the veto (Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast, 1989, p. 605). In sum, the burdens 
and obstacles to collective action will frequently outweigh benefits that members of the 
EU legislatures will receive from formal exercise of the veto, and the accommodationism 
of the Commission will strengthen the hand of individual bargaining with the Commission 
to obtain concessions.   
While the Lisbon Treaty sought to enhance the oversight powers of the EP through 
making adjustments in the grounds and timing for vetoing a Commission’s DA (van Gestel, 
2014), these political dynamics remain fundamentally unchanged, and would appear to 
matter more than the precise structure of the legislative veto mechanism. Accordingly, I 
hypothesize: 
H1: Neither EP nor the Council veto Commission's quasi-legislative acts more 
frequently than before.  
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More specifically, the obstacles to EP exercising a formal legislative veto are even 
higher than for the Council. The transaction costs for collective action are obviously higher 
in Parliament. The existence of multiple parties in Parliament further raises the cost of 
reaching agreement. Moreover, individual MEP have to mediate between allegiance to 
their parties and national delegations which also increasing the difficulty of finding issues 
that will gain coalition support. At a practical level, the maximum of four-month deadline 
for exercising the veto makes external research very difficult to assemble, especially given 
the small numbers of secretariat and MEP support staff.1 As a result, initiating collective 
action is likely to be led by MEPs with particularly strong stakes in particular Commission 
acts or policies and with the support by interest groups which enhances their capacity to 
have timely, ready-made solutions to issues they have followed and monitored the issue 
for years (Hardacre and Damen, 2009).  
Council´s incentive structure is simpler than the EP’s. Instead of political 
constituencies or independent parties, member state representatives are beholden to their 
own national governments, and to represent their national government´s interest in the 
Union´s policy-making process (Beyers and Dierickx, 1998). This particular focus on the 
effects of Union laws on their own member states, however, diminishes the extent to which 
they are likely to have an incentive to investigate, or invest energies in overriding, a 
Commission´s regulatory policy. As long as the Commission strategically avoids directly 
harming the interests of a particular member state, or tight coalition of states, its measures 
are unlikely to provoke much attention at the Council level, despite lower transaction costs 
for collective action in the Council. 
                                                 
1 Egeberg, M., Gornitzka A., Trondal, J. and Johannessen M. (2016) ´Parliament staff: unpacking the 
behaviour of officials in the European Parliament´, Journal of European Public Policy 20(4): 495-514. 
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H2: The Council will more frequently enact vetoes of Commission acts than EP. 
Research design 
To assess the experience and impact of legislative vetoes in EU policy-making, the 
dependent variable is a count variable representing the frequency of successful and 
unsuccessful legislative vetoes. We differentiate between EP vetoes and objections by the 
Council to control for differences in their execution of legislative oversight rights. 
Considering the different dates of the entry into force for DA (2009), I decided to 
investigate the complete period from December 2009 until April 2017.   
To test our hypotheses, I extracted data from the websites of the EP´s and Council´s 
co-decision units and complemented it with information from the European Parliament´s 
Unit for Reception and Referral of Official Documents. For cross-checking purposes and 
the procurement of additional data I conducted interviews with civil servants from the 
secretariats of the EP and Council.  
Table 1 summarizes the total number of concluded legislative files including 
provisions for DA (so-called basic legislative acts). It took about a year after the entry into 
force of article 290 TFEU before EP and Council started adopting the first legislative files 
including provisions for DA.2 In the meantime, in 2016, 51 per cent of the total number of 
concluded legislative files provided for DA empowerments.  
 
  
                                                 
2 The first basic acts including DA provision were Regulation 438/2010 on pet animals, Directive 2010/45 
on human organs transplantation, Directive 2010/30 on energy labelling, Regulation 973/2010 on customs 
tariff Azores & Madeira, and Regulations 1092 to 1095/2010 and Directive 2010/78 on financial supervision 
package. 
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Table 1. Number of concluded legislative files including provisions for DA (2009- April 
2017) 
 
Year Number of 
concluded 
legislative files 
including 
provisions for DA 
Number of 
paragraphs 
empowering DA 
Total 
number of 
legislative 
acts 
 
per cent- share 
between number of 
concluded legislative 
acts and those 
including provisions 
for DA 
2010 22 62 66 33 % 
2011 26 91 64 41 % 
2012 22 207 87 25 % 
2013 62 383 79 78 % 
2014 76 350 192 40 % 
2015 22 79 57 39% 
2016 34 273 67 51% 
2017 5 42 (-) (-) 
 
Total 
 
270 
 
1487 
 
612 
 
44 % 
Source: Based on the information from the European Parliament´s Unit for Reception and 
Referral of Official Documents 
 
Legislative files with DA provisions most frequently cover environmental policies 
(20 per cent), financial services (15 per cent), transport (10 per cent), internal market and 
consumer protection (9 per cent), agriculture, and international trade (8 per cent), i.e. only 
six policy areas represent 70 per cent of the total.  
Since the number of basic acts does not necessarily correspond to the absolute 
number of DA and RPS measures eventually adopted by the Commission—the 
Commission can issue multiple DA under a single basic act—table 2 reports the full list 
DA submitted to Parliament and the Council between 2009 and April 2017.  
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Table 2. DA submitted to Parliament and Council (2009- April 2017) 
 
Year Delegated acts submitted  
2009 - 
2010 4 
2011 7 
2012 38 
2013 57 
2014 177 
2015 106 
2016 139 
2017 17 
 
Total 
 
545 
Source: Based on the information from the European Parliament´s Unit for Reception and 
Referral of Official Documents 
 
These figures show that the number of DA submitted to the EU legislators grew 
steadily with its introduction in 2009 with an all-time peak (177) in 2014 and 2016 (139), 
i.e. a total number of 545. 
Most DA cover only few policy areas: monetary affairs (31 per cent), agriculture 
(17 per cent), and environment (14 per cent).  
All in all, the Commission submitted during the 2009-2017 terms 545 DA 
representing the study´s reference point. 
 
2. Infrequent use of legislative vetoes by the European Parliament 
The results are presented in tables 3 and 4 displaying the frequency of (un-) successful 
vetoes in the framework of DA. 
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Table 3. Number of (un-) successful vetoes of DA by the European Parliament (2009- April 2017) 
Result Number of 
cases 
Details of cases (in chronological order) 
Successful veto 
in plenary 
(absolute 
majority) 
6 Definition of “engineered nanomaterials” (ENVI); cadmium in illumination and display 
lightning (ENVI); ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin (AGRI); processed cereal-based food 
and baby food (ENVI); packaged retail and insurance- based investment products (ECON); 
high-risk third countries with strategic deficiencies (ECON/LIBE) 
Unsuccessful 
veto in plenary 
11 Scheme of generalized tariff preferences (INTA); PPP (ECON); OTC derivates (ECON, 
withdrawn); ACP group of states (INTA); Solvency II (ECON); 2x schemes of generalized 
tariff preferences (INTA); EU guarantee to the EIB Belarus (BUDG); minimum requirement 
for own funds and eligible liabilities (ECON); position limits to commodity derivatives 
(ECON); model financial regulation for PPP (BUDG); Union customs code (IMCO) 
Unsuccessful 
motion for veto 
in parliamentary 
committee 
(simple 
majority) 
16 GMES (ITRE); direct payments to farmers (AGRI); integrated administration and control 
system and conditions for refusal or withdrawal of payments (AGRI); paying agencies and 
other bodies, financial management (AGRI); public intervention expenditure (AGRI); the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) (AGRI); fruit and vegetables 
and processed fruit and vegetables sectors (AGRI); school fruit and vegetables scheme 
(AGRI); support programs for the olive-oil and table-olives sector (AGRI); agricultural 
products benefiting from private storage aid (AGRI); national support programs in the 
wine sector (AGRI); generalized tariff preferences Philippines (INTA); information relating 
to infant and young child feeding (ENVI); food for special medical purposes (ENVI); food 
information of gluten (ENVI); guidelines in the field of officially supported export credits 
(INTA) 
 
Total 
 
33 (out of 545) 
(6%) 
 
Source: Based on the information from the European Parliament´s Unit for Reception and Referral of Official Documents
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For DA, the figures are revealing. Out of a total of 545 DA submitted to the EU 
legislator, EP considered objections in 33 cases (6 per cent) out of which six files were 
eventually vetoed successfully.  
 
Table 4. Number of successful vetoes of DA by the Council of Ministers (2009- April 
2017) 
Result Number of 
cases 
Details of cases (in chronological order) 
Successful veto 
(qualified 
majority) 
2 Galileo, format for research and development 
expenditure data  
 
Total 
 
2 (out of 545) 
(0,3%) 
 
Source: Based on the reports from the Commission on the working of committees,  
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=Report.Report, updated in 
September 2014  
 
From the EP´s perspective, the two tables lead us to two central conclusions: firstly, 
Parliament rarely exercised its veto power to overrule quasi-legislative regulatory decision 
during 2009 to April 2017. In less than 1 per cent of all cases it opposed successfully to 
quasi-legislative instruments. Secondly, EP appears to be more active in using its oversight 
powers related to DA than RPS measures (2 per cent) (cp. Kaeding and Stack, 2015). In 
the following, I consider the results for the Council. 
 
3. Isolated use of legislative vetoes by the Council of Ministers 
Out of the 545 DA submitted to the Council during a period of eight years, Council 
successfully objected in only two case, which occurred in 2013 and 2014. The first case 
concerned common minimum standards on the rules for access to the public regulated 
service provided by the global navigation satellite system. Member states´ concerns 
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focused on three aspects: the scope of the act (i.e. its applicability to the Commission and 
agencies, not only to member states); some of the definitions; and the question of the 
attribution of the role of competent public regulated service authority (with a view to giving 
member states greater freedom in determining their internal organization).  
From the Council’s perspective, the two tables lead us to two central conclusions: 
firstly, Council rarely exercised its veto power to overrule quasi-legislative regulatory 
decision during 2009 to April 2017. In less than 0,4 per cent of all cases it opposed 
successfully to quasi-legislative instruments. Secondly, Council appears to be more active 
in using its oversight powers related to RPS measures in comparison to DA (cp. Kaeding 
and Stack, 2015). In the following, I compare the results for the two EU legislators. 
Summary of results 
Eight years after the introduction of the EU legislative veto, both EU legislators 
have used their formal veto powers rarely. Thus far both legislators objected to only two 
DA (Council) and six (EP) respectively (out of a total of 545 DA adopted between 2009 
and 2014). Consequently, I see not only low levels of formal exercise of the legislative veto 
overruling Commission regulatory policies by both legislators, but also no significant 
overall differences between RPS measures and DAs (cp. Kaeding and Stack, 2015).  
 
4. Discussion 
Cadmium in illuminations, processed cereal-based baby food or packaged insurance- based 
investment products - the delegation of rule-making powers has become a nearly universal 
feature of the European legal systems. As broad discretionary power is vested in 
administrative actors, the Commission, there is a strong legitimacy demand for legislative 
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oversight of administrative action to ensure that it achieves commonly agreed upon 
objectives of the member states and ultimately the people. One of the most touted EU 
mechanisms for oversight and respective accountability for collective decisions 
(Brandsma, 2013) of the Commission is the legislative veto, whether in the context of the 
regulatory procedure with scrutiny (RPS) or post-Lisbon DA.  
As it turns out, the EP and Council have rarely invested in taking formal measures 
to override Commission regulatory policies. Over an eight year period, from 2009 to April 
2017, EP and Council considered legislative vetoes in a meager 6 per cent (DA), and 
eventually opposed to only 1 per cent and less from all possible cases successfully. These 
figures may not match the EP´s and Council´s energy for including legislative veto 
provisions in legislation in the first place, and the initial ‘fear that Parliament would be 
tempted to (ab)use the new power too often, thus frustrating the smooth implementation of 
legislation’ (Hardacre and Damen, 2009: 3), but follow the expectations of principles of 
political economy.  
The relatively difference between the RPS vetoes and DAs (cp. Kaeding and Stack, 
2015) also suggests that the easing of the formal requirements for exercising a veto under 
article 290 has had only a very modest impact on the patterns of their exercise.  
However, these results do not imply that Parliament and Council have been sitting 
on their hands. The Parliament´s ECON (economic and financial affairs) Committee, for 
example, set up so-called corrective scrutiny and preventive scrutiny slots. About once a 
month one or two delegated acts dossiers, selected by the political groups´ coordinators, 
are publicly discussed in the ECON Committee. In addition, the creation of three agencies 
(ESAs), which conduct public consultations and make text proposals for DAs, which are 
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then endorsed by the Commission, has been used in an intelligent way. If the Commission 
wants to introduce non-substantial changes to the text proposals, it is free to do so and then 
adopt the DA. But if the Commission wants to introduce substantial changes to the 
agencies- drafts, they need to re-consult the agencies3. That is when the EP can intervene 
as a go-between. The EP would work with the information gleaned during the time-
consuming public consultations. In practice, it is the stakeholders, which inform the 
interested MEP. Using the preventive scrutiny, the EP (or more precisely the selected 
MEPs) can intervene in a more subtle way than the ´nuclear weapon´ of an accept/reject 
situation. In fact the weight of the EP in these negotiations is strengthened by the possibility 
to use the ´nuclear weapon´. In essence, the EP acts as a transmission mechanism for 
stakeholders´ views. 
Consequently, despite the reported low levels of formal exercise of the legislative 
scrutiny of Commission quasi-legislative actsthe legislative veto has been an significant 
tool of oversight with an impact on Commission actions.  Because members of the 
Commission can anticipate legislative opposition and accommodate it when raised, these 
new EU legislative veto mechanisms may still have a significant influence on the content 
of Commission action. In view of its own attenuated political legitimacy, the Commission 
has a strong institutional interest in avoiding a direct, open confrontation with either 
European legislator. Moreover, as a repeat player in drafting quasi-legislation, whether in 
the form of the RPS procedure or DAs, the Commission has a strong incentive to avoid 
establishing a practice of frequently legislative override of its actions (Stack, 2014, p. 84). 
                                                 
3 For more details on the EU agencies´ role in drafting quasi-legislative acts see Costa, M. and Kaeding, M. 
“The conferral of powers to EU agencies: the case of delegated and implementing acts”, Paper presented at 
the Workshop “Legislative Choice between Delegated and Implementing Acts” at the Deutsche Universität 
für Verwaltungswissenschaften in Speyer on 20 March 2017. 
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As a result, there are especially strong reasons to expect that the Commission will 
frequently be willing to compromise on specific substantive policy to avoid a political 
confrontation with either European legislators (Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast, 1989), 
or negotiate to make concessions to European legislators (Stack, 2014, p. 84).    
Such ‘latent oversight’ is notoriously difficult to observe, even if its ‘role in 
implementing political control over the [bureaucracy] is in principle just as important as 
that of active control.’ (Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast, 1989, p. 605). While it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to theorize or document the practice of negotiations between 
the Commission and the EP, there is some evidence that a ‘de facto legislative right of 
amendment’ (Ponzano, 2008) through individual negotiations, not the formal exercise of 
the veto, have taken hold (Kaeding and Hardacre, 2013). These negotiations are not always 
public and therefore difficult to uncover, but in two cases, parliamentary committees for 
environmental affairs (on the use of animal testing) and for transport and tourism (on the 
use of seatbelts for children in air-planes) drafted objecting resolutions which were 
withdrawn even before the committee vote (see Hardacre and Damen for more detailed 
discussion) after the Commission indicated that the modiﬁcations required by the EP would 
be taken into account in a subsequent revision of the implementing measures.  
This paper reveals the grounds for and documented the infrequent use of the formal 
exercise of the legislative veto in the EU, even under the reforms of Lisbon.  That 
conclusion provides a critical perspective on the achievements of the Lisbon’s restructure 
of legislative oversight. It also exposes a critical agenda for future theoretical and empirical 
research: How do informal negotiations with the Commission work? To what extent do the 
EP and Council exercise latent power over the Commission? And more generally, under 
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what circumstances does this more informal oversight enhance the democratic legitimacy 
of the Commission’s regulatory policy or, alternatively, lower the cost for interest groups 
to extract concessions from the Commission through lobbying individual legislators? 
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